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Summary
This report provides an overview of Jordanian politics and current issues in
U.S.-Jordanian relations. It provides a brief overview of Jordan’s government and
economy and of its cooperation in promoting Arab-Israeli peace and other U.S.
policy objectives in the Middle East. This report will be updated regularly. It
supersedes CRS Issue Brief IB93085, Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues,
by Alfred B. Prados.
Several issues in U.S.-Jordanian relations are likely to figure in decisions by
Congress and the Administration on future aid to and cooperation with Jordan.
These include the stability of the Jordanian regime, democratic reform under way in
Jordan, the role of Jordan in the Arab-Israeli peace process, Jordan’s concerns over
the U.S.-led campaign against Iraq in 2003, and its relations with other regional
states.  Following the 9/11 attacks, Jordan issued bans on banking operations linked
to terrorist activities and pursued individuals linked to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda
organization.
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal
treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the
years.  The country’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it
dependent on aid from Western and friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular,
has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external.
Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia,
has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its more powerful neighbors, but
has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential
adversaries.  In 1990, Jordan’s unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq
disrupted its relations with the United States and the Persian Gulf states; however,
relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an increasing role in the
Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
For fiscal year 2007, the Bush Administration has requested $245 million in
economic aid and $206 million in military aid to Jordan. Congress recently passed
the FY2006 Emergency Supplemental Act (P.L. 109-234) which provides $50
million in economic assistance to Jordan.
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Most Recent Developments
On June 11, 2006, four Jordanian Islamist parliamentarians were arrested on
charges of “fueling national discord and inciting sectarianism” after visiting the
family of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born terrorist leader killed in a U.S.
air strike in Iraq. At this time, it is unclear how long their detention will last or when
the four deputies will be tried. One of the arrested Islamists reportedly called Zarqawi
a “martyr.”
On May 3, 2006, the National Labor Committee (NLC), a New York-based
human rights advocacy group, issued a 161-page report alleging sweatshop-like
conditions in 28 out of 100 Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) plants in Jordan. Jordan’s
trade minister Sharif Zu’bi subsequently acknowledged that the government had
failed in some instances to enforce its own labor laws and has taken action since to
close down factories in violation of the law. The NLC has recognized the
government’s recent actions, though it has suggested that violations of worker rights
could continue in smaller factories without sufficient oversight.
Overview
Although the United States and Jordan have never been linked by a formal
treaty, they have cooperated on a number of regional and international issues over the
years.  The country’s small size and lack of major economic resources have made it
dependent on aid from Western and friendly Arab sources. U.S. support, in particular,
has helped Jordan deal with serious vulnerabilities, both internal and external.
Jordan’s geographic position, wedged between Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia,
has made it vulnerable to the strategic designs of its more powerful neighbors, but
has also given Jordan an important role as a buffer between these potential
adversaries.  In 1990, Jordan’s unwillingness to join the allied coalition against Iraq
disrupted its relations with the United States and the Persian Gulf states; however,
relations improved throughout the 1990s as Jordan played an increasing role in the
Arab-Israeli peace process and distanced itself from the Iraqi regime of Saddam
Hussein.
Domestic Politics and the Economy
Jordan, created by colonial powers after World War I, initially consisted of
desert or semi-desert territory east of the Jordan River, inhabited largely by people
of Bedouin tribal background.  The establishment of the state of Israel brought large
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1 A commentator recently estimated that 67% of the population is of Palestinian descent.
Tom Pepper, “Building a Safe Haven,” Middle East Economic Digest, July 22-28, 2005.
numbers of Palestinian refugees to Jordan, which subsequently annexed a small
Palestinian enclave west of the Jordan River.  The original “East Bank” Jordanians,
though probably no longer a majority in Jordan, remain predominant in the country’s
political and military establishments and form the bedrock of support for the
Jordanian monarchy.  Palestinians, who comprise an estimated 55% to 70% of the
population, in some cases tend to regard their stay in Jordan as temporary, and others
are at most lukewarm in their support for the Jordanian regime.1
The Hashemite Royal Family
Jordan is a hereditary constitu-
tional monarchy under the presti-
gious Hashemite family, which
claims descent from the Prophet
Muhammad.  King Abdullah II has
ruled the country since 1999, when
he succeeded to the throne upon the
death of his father, the late King
Hussein, upon the latter’s death
after a 47-year reign.  Educated
largely in Britain and the United
States, King Abdullah had earlier
pursued a military career, ultimately
serving as commander of Jordan’s
Special Operations Forces with the
rank of Major General.  There is
currently no designated Crown
Prince; however, under Article 28
of the Jordanian constitution, the
King’s 11-year-old son Prince
Hussein is next in line of succession
to the throne.  King Abdullah has
won approval for his energetic and
hands-on style of governing; how-
ever, some Jordanians, notably Pal-
estinians and Islamic fundamental-
ists, are opposed to his policies of
cooperating with the United States on issues such as Iraq and the Arab-Israeli peace
process.
The king appoints a prime minister to head the government and the Council of
Ministers (cabinet).  Typically, Jordanian governments last about 1.5 years before
they are dissolved by royal decree. This is done in order to bolster the king’s reform
credentials and to dispense patronage to various elites. The king also appoints all
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personnel 100,500; tanks 952;
combat aircraft 101
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Debt (2004): $8.4 billion
Sources:  U.S. Dept. of State; Central Bank of Jordan;
other U.S. and Jordanian government departments;
The Economist Intelligence Unit (London)
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2 Samer Abu Libdeh, “Jordan Looks Inward: The Hashemite Kingdom in the Wake of
Zarqawi and the Hamas-Israel Clash,” PolicyWatch #1120, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, July 7, 2006. 
Parliament
Jordan’s bicameral legislature is composed of an elected 110-member lower
house and an appointed 55-member upper house.  Building on his father’s legacy,
King Abdullah has supported a limited parliamentary democracy, while periodically
curtailing dissent when it threatened economic reforms or normalization of relations
with Israel.  The most recent parliamentary elections, held on June 17, 2003, gave 62
seats in the 110-member lower house to conservative, independent, and tribal allies
of King Abdullah.  However, the moderately fundamentalist Islamic Action Front
(IAF), which had boycotted the previous elections in 1997, won 22% of the vote,
thereby gaining 18 seats in the lower house, plus six sympathizers.  Six seats in the
lower house were reserved for women, one of whom is a member of the IAF.  The
IAF also participated in municipal elections for the capital city of Amman, held on
July 26-27, 2003, but boycotted elections in other municipalities in protest against
what IAF spokesmen called undemocratic electoral procedures. 
The Jordanian Parliament has limited power. In theory, it can override the veto
authority of the king with a two-thirds majority in both the upper and lower houses.
A two-thirds majority of the lower house can also dissolve the cabinet with a “no
confidence” vote. However, since both houses have solid pro-government majorities,
such actions are rarely attempted (once in April 1963). 
Overall, political parties in Jordan are extremely weak, as the IAF is the only
well organized movement. Most parties represent narrow parochial interests and are
composed of prominent individuals representing a particular family or tribe. There
are approximately 36 small parties in Jordan, consisting of only 4,100 total members.
According to Jordanian scholar Samer Abu Libdeh, a draft political parties law
submitted by the government would require parties to include members from at least
five different governorates, legally forcing parties to reach out nationally rather than
appeal to their local constituencies.2 
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood
The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has long been integrated into the political
mainstream due to its acceptance of the legitimacy of Hashemite monarchy, although
relations between the Brotherhood and the Palace have fluctuated over the years. The
Brotherhood presence in Jordan dates back to the 1930s, as it has been tacitly
recognized first as a charitable organization and later as a quasi-political
organization, which has openly fielded candidates in parliamentary elections albeit
under a different name (Islamic Action Front, IAF). The relationship between the
Brotherhood and the Palace has been mutually beneficial over the years. Successive
Jordanian monarchs have found that the Brotherhood has been more useful politically
as an ally than as an opponent (as opposed to the Brotherhood in Egypt), as it secured
Islamist support in countering Arab nationalist interference during the 1950’s and
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1960’s and secular Palestinian nationalism in the 1970s. The Brotherhood’s
educational, social, and health services have grown so extensive over the years that
some experts believe that the Brotherhood’s budget for services rivals that of the
Jordanian government.
In 2006, there has been much speculation about the IAF’s ties to Hamas. In a
recent interview on Al Arabiya, Zaki Sa’d Bani-Irshayd, the new secretary general
of the IAF, was careful to emphasize that the IAF and Hamas have agreed to avoid
any inter-organizational relations, emphasizing that each movement has its own
financial, administrative, and organizational system. On February 16, 2006, Jordanian
Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit congratulated Hamas on winning the January 2006
Palestinian Authority legislative elections and said Jordan would welcome a visit by
a Hamas delegation. However, on April 20, 2006, the press reported that Jordan
cancelled a planned visit by the Palestinian Foreign Minister Mahmoud al-Zahar,
who is also a high-level Hamas official, on the grounds that Hamas had hidden
weapons and explosives in a cache in Jordan. Hamas denied the charge and claimed
that Jordan was using this allegation to justify cancelling the visit. Hamas had been
expelled from Jordan in 1999, shortly after the ascension of King Abdullah II to the
throne.
In June 2006, just days after the death of the terrorist mastermind Abu Mus’ab
al-Zarqawi, four IAF parliamentarians were arrested after making statements praising
the Al Qaeda leader. One IAF deputy reportedly remarked that Zarqawi was a
“martyr” and a holy warrior. Several weeks later, the Jordanian government dissolved
the administration of the Islamic Centre Charity Society, the Brotherhood’s main
vehicle for dispensing social welfare to its supporters.  Some estimate that the charity
controls over $1 billion in assets. The Jordanian Ministry of Social Development
(MoSD) appointed a seven-member ad hoc board to run the charity.
Professional Associations 
Jordan’s 14 professional associations, consisting of approximately 130,000
members, have traditionally been dominated by Islamist and nationalist groups
opposed to normalizing relations with Israel or cooperating with U.S. policies on
Iraq.  The Jordanian government has periodically curtailed the activities of these
associations, periodically arresting leaders and curtailing demonstrations.  More
recently, the government has circulated a draft law which alters the electoral
procedures for professional associations in a way that would dilute the influence of
Islamist candidates and prohibit ties to association branches in the Palestinian
territories.3  The law was debated in parliament but not enacted during the summer
of 2005.  On August 24, Prime Minister Badran told reporters that the government
would not withdraw the controversial bill but that the bill would include some
unspecified amendments. 
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The Military and Security Establishment
 Many tribal east bank Jordanians or their descendants form the backbone of
Jordan’s armed forces and internal security establishment. Most observers agree that
with the possible exception of Syria, Jordan faces few conventional threats from its
neighbors and that the greatest threats to its security are internal and asymmetrical.
In general, counter-terrorism and homeland security policies are carried out by a
number of institutions, most notably the security services under direct palace control,
the military, and the Interior Ministry. The General Intelligence Directorate (GID)
reports directly to King Abdullah II and is responsible for both covert operations
abroad and internal security. The military’s elite special forces units also are directly
involved in countering threats to internal security and were reportedly used to thwart
a chemical weapons plot in April 2004. The Interior Ministry controls all civilian
police forces and civil defense units through a branch agency known as the Public
Security Directorate (PSD). 
Reform
The reform process in Jordan largely comes from the top down, as King
Abdullah has worked hard at cultivating a progressive image for both himself and the
government. Nevertheless, the pace of reforms, particularly democratic reform,
remains slow by Western standards, as for every step forward on issues such as
women’s rights, economic liberalization, and education, there are steps back on press
freedoms and institutional reforms. Jordanian officials have been adamant in insisting
that they be allowed to institute social changes at their own pace, asserting that
Jordanian society has changed dramatically over the past century from a desert tribal
society into a modern nation state. The Jordanian government believes that some
portions of its population are suspicious of U.S. intentions in the region and that local
leaders would consider some U.S. democratic reform proposals to be antithetical to
Jordan’s conservative Islamic and tribal social culture. 
In order to jumpstart the reform process and possibly appease some Western
donors, the King formed a National Agenda Committee to develop a road map to
reforming economic and political life. The National Agenda was released in early
2006 as a 10-year plan for comprehensive reform of eight sectors: education,
infrastructure, employment, social welfare, finances, judiciary, investment, and
political development. Since its release, the political reform goals have been the most
controversial, pitting liberal reformists against conservative and traditional forces.
Meanwhile, Jordan has also been the recipient of several grants under the U.S.-
sponsored Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) program for projects in the
political, economic, educational, and women’s fields.
The Economy
Jordan, with few natural resources and a small industrial base, has an economy
which is heavily dependent on external aid from abroad, tourism, expatriate worker
remittances, and the service sector. Among the longstanding problems Jordan faces
are corruption, slow economic growth, and high levels of unemployment, nominally
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4 One factor that exacerbates the unemployment situation in Jordan is the social stigma
attached to menial labor jobs. Referred to as the “culture of shame,” Jordanian tribal
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government estimates that there are approximately 300-400 thousand foreign laborers in
Jordan working as domestic laborers, bricklayers, and other tasks. 
5 Prior to the Iraq War in 2003, Jordan had received oil from Iraq at deeply reduced prices.
After Iraqi oil shipments ceased during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Jordan received some oil
from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on a temporary basis at
discounted rates. In the spring of 2006, Jordan stopped receiving oil discounts from its
neighbors forcing it to purchase all of its oil needs  (100,000 barrels per day) at international
market prices. 
around 15% but thought by many analysts to be in the 25%-30% range.4  Corruption,
common in most developing nations, is particularly pronounced in Jordan. Use of
intermediaries, referred to in Arabic as “Wasta”(connections), is widespread, and
many young Jordanians have grown frustrated by the lack of social and economic
mobility that corruption engenders. Each year,  thousands of Jordanians go abroad
in search of better jobs and opportunities. 
In recent years, Jordan has experienced solid economic growth, though
inflationary pressures, budget deficits, and population growth have worked to
minimize some of its benefits. The London-based Economic Intelligence Unit
forecasts GDP growth to be close to 4.5% in 2006. High oil prices have impacted the
Jordanian economy in different ways. On the one hand, oil booms benefit the families
of Jordanians employed in oil-rich nations of the Persian Gulf, as these guest workers
have more income to send back home or invest in Jordanian real estate. On the other
hand, higher oil prices put enormous pressure on the national budget, since the
government subsidizes gas and home heating oil. In 2005, the government enacted
several cuts to the fuel subsidy, effectively raising the price of gas in increments
ranging from 8% to 59%.5 Although in the past, deep cuts to certain subsidies have
led to social unrest, there has been no such reaction from the public thus far.
Nevertheless, the government is keenly aware of growing dissatisfaction from rising
prices. 
The situation in Iraq has had a noticeable impact on Jordan’s economy. An
estimated 500,000-700,000 Iraqis have moved to Jordan since 2003, infusing its
economy with new investment, particularly in the real estate sector. In the capital of
Amman, new construction is evident and land prices have skyrocketed.  Jordan also
has served as a staging ground for international contractors involved in Iraqi
reconstruction, bringing a number of foreigners to Amman in recent years. 
Water Shortages. Jordan is one of the ten most water deprived countries in
the world and is in constant search of new water resources. The Dead Sea, which
abuts both Jordan and Israel, is losing water at an estimated three feet per year, and
some scientists suggest that without significant action it will be gone by 2050. Jordan
has been exploring new water development projects, including the feasibility of
pumping water from the Red Sea, desalinating it, and then transferring it down to the
Dead Sea. This project, referred to as the Red-Dead Canal, is being studied by the
government and international lenders. 
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Current Issues in U.S.-Jordanian Relations
Terrorism
Jordan is a key partner in fighting international Islamic terrorist groups, as its
main intelligence organization, the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), is
considered one of the most effective organizations in the region at infiltrating Jihadist
networks. Jordanian intelligence reportedly played a role in assisting U.S. forces in
killing Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the fugitive Jordanian terrorist mastermind who
headed the Al Qaeda in Iraq organization until his death in June 2006.
Jordan’s cooperative relationship with the United States has made it  vulnerable
to terrorist attacks, particularly from organizations operating from Iraq. On
November 9, 2005, near simultaneous explosions at three western-owned hotels in
Amman (the Radisson, Grand Hyatt, and Days Inn) killed 58 persons and seriously
wounded approximately 100 others. The terrorist organization Al-Qaeda in Iraq,
formerly headed by Zarqawi, claimed responsibility for the act.  Many Jordanians,
even some who disagree with their government’s support for U.S. Middle East
policies, have condemned the hotel bombings, which killed many Jordanians, and
denounced Zarqawi’s actions. King Abdullah has said the attacks were aimed at
ordinary Jordanians, not foreigners, noting that the hotels, though western owned,
were frequented by local citizens. On November 15, 2005, Jordan’s Minister of the
Interior announced new security regulations designed to keep foreign militants from
operating covertly in Jordan, including a requirement for Jordanians to notify
authorities within 48 hours of renting an apartment or a house to foreigners. An
official of the Interior Ministry also said Jordan had already begun drafting new and
tougher anti-terrorism laws which are currently under debate in parliament.
Other recent terrorist activity in Jordan include the following:
! On October 28, 2002, Lawrence Foley, a U.S. diplomat assigned to
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) program
in Jordan, was shot and killed by an unknown assailant as Foley was
leaving for work. A Jordanian military court convicted and
sentenced to death eight Islamic militants linked to Al Qaeda and
presumably involved in the Foley murder; the court sentenced two
others to jail terms and acquitted one defendant.  Six of the eight
sentenced to death were tried in absentia, including Zarqawi, and
two more were executed on March 11, 2006.
! In April 2004, Jordanian authorities reportedly uncovered a plot by
a terrorist cell linked to Zarqawi which planned to launch a chemical
attack in the Jordanian capital of Amman. According to press
reports, in January 2004, one of the would-be perpetrators visited
Iraq, where he obtained $170,000, which Zarqawi had collected from
Syrian donors to pay for the attack.  The plot was reportedly foiled
by Jordanian police and elite special forces units in a series of
operations in Amman.
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! On August 19, 2005, rockets apparently aimed at two U.S.
amphibious warfare ships visiting the Jordanian port of Aqaba
narrowly missed their targets, one hitting a nearby warehouse and
another landing near a hospital; a third rocket struck near the airport
at the neighboring Israeli port of Eilat.  A Jordanian soldier was
killed and another injured in the attack.  There were two claims of
responsibility, both from groups believed to be affiliated with bin
Laden or his associate Zarqawi.
Jordan’s Role in Promoting Peace in the Middle East
Peace Agreements and Normalization.  Jordan and Israel signed a peace
treaty on October 26, 1994.  Later, the two countries exchanged ambassadors; Israel
returned approximately 131 square miles of territory near the Rift Valley to Jordan;
the Jordanian Parliament repealed laws banning contacts with Israel; and the two
countries signed a number of bilateral agreements between 1994 and 1996 to
normalize economic and cultural links.  Water sharing, a recurring problem, was
partially resolved in May 1997 when the two countries reached an interim
arrangement under which Israel began pumping 72,000 cubic meters of water from
Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) to Jordan per day (equivalent to 26.3 million cubic
meters per year — a little over half the target amount envisioned in an annex to the
peace treaty).
Opposition to Normalization.  King Abdullah’s efforts to normalize
relations with Israel have faced significant resistance within Jordan, particularly
among Islamic fundamentalist groups, parts of the Palestinian community, and
influential trade and professional organizations (see above). Among many
mainstream Jordanians, there is some disappointment that peace with Israel has not
brought more tangible economic benefits to them so far.  Opponents of normalization
have repeatedly called on Jordanians to boycott contacts with Israel, and activists
among them have compiled two “black lists” of Jordanian individuals and companies
that deal with Israel.  The Jordanian government has arrested organizers of these lists,
but courts have upheld their right to publish them.
Further Arab-Israeli Negotiations.  Jordan supports current Middle East
peace plans, including a land-for-peace initiative proposed by Saudi then-Crown
Prince Abdullah and adopted by the Arab League in March 2002; and the Road Map,
a three-phase process released by the so-called Quartet (the United States, the
European Union, Russia, and the United Nations) on April 30, 2003, in an effort to
jump-start the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  On June 4, 2003, King Abdullah
hosted a summit conference at the Red Sea port of Aqaba attended by President Bush
and the Israeli and Palestinian Prime Ministers, where attendees discussed steps to
implement the Road Map.  Despite the subsequent breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian
talks, King Abdullah has continued to press for resumption of negotiations. Jordan
initially opposed an Israeli proposal to withdraw unilaterally from the Gaza Strip and
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7  On August 30, 1999, Jordanian security forces closed offices used by the fundamentalist
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8 Some U.S.-Jordanian tension arose in early 2005 over restrictions imposed by the U.S.
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Arab Bank, which allegedly allowed diversion of funds to families of Palestinians involved
in attacks against Israelis.  See, Glenn R. Simpson, “U.S. Crackdown On Arab Bank Tangles
Policy,” Wall Street Journal, Feb. 28, 2005. Jordanian officials have stressed that in 2006,
banks in Jordan are complying with U.S. regulations to ban all financial transactions with
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9 “Jordan’s Islamic Action Front Leader Comments on Ties with HAMAS,” Dubai Al-
Arabiyah Television, translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service [FBIS], April
(continued...)
four West Bank towns, but later expressed support as long as the withdrawal was part
of the Road Map process.6 
The West Bank and East Jerusalem.  The Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty
does not address the status of the West Bank territory, which was annexed by Jordan
in 1950 but occupied by Israel in 1967, nor does it address the status of East
Jerusalem (except as noted below); both issues are subjects of Israeli-Palestinian
rather than Israeli-Jordanian negotiations.  The late King Hussein decided in August
1988 “to disengage our legal and administrative relations with the West Bank,” but
he and King Abdullah remained involved in Palestinian issues. 
Jerusalem.  On a related issue, Palestinian leaders have taken exception to
Article 9 of the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian treaty, which states that Israel “respects the
historical role of the Hashemite Kingdom [of Jordan] in the mosques of Jerusalem”
and “will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.”  The late
Palestinian leader Arafat asserted that “sovereignty over Jerusalem and supervision
of Jerusalem is for Palestinians.”  In a speech to a Washington, DC audience on May
13, 2002, King Abdullah said that under a peace deal that he envisions, “[t]he
Jerusalem question would be answered, by providing for a shared city open to all
faiths.”
Hamas and Rejectionist Groups.7  Since the 2006 Hamas electoral victory,
the Jordanian government has been placed in a difficult position. Much of its
citizenry (with perhaps more than half of Palestinian origin) sympathizes with
Hamas,8 and Jordan’s own Islamist party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) reportedly
maintains close ties to Hamas. In a recent interview on Al Arabiya, Zaki Sa’d Bani-
Irshayd, the new secretary general of the IAF, was careful to emphasize that the IAF
and Hamas have agreed to avoid any inter-organizational relations between them,
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Iraq
Jordanian Policy Toward the Iraq War and Its Aftermath.  Though not
in favor of military action against Iraq, Jordan informally provided logistical support
to the U.S.-led campaign to oust Saddam Hussein in the spring of 2003.10  Since mid-
2003, Jordan has conducted training at Jordanian installations for selected units of
a new Iraqi army and police force.  Jordan strongly supported the elections held in
Iraq on January 30, 2005, for a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), under a
timetable adopted early in 2004.  Jordanian leaders have been concerned, however,
that the growing power of Iraq’s Shi’ite Muslim majority could lead to a wider role
for Iran in influencing Iraqi affairs.  In December 2004, King Abdullah (a Sunni
Muslim like almost all Jordanians) expressed concern that Iran was trying to
manipulate Iraqi Shi’ite Muslims in an effort to bring about an Islamic republic
similar to the Iranian model in Iraq.11  He has also voiced concern over the possibility
of Sunni-Shi’ite conflict within the region.12  The King has been careful to point out
that the leaders of Jordan “do not have a problem with Shi’ites” and has emphasized
that his concerns are political, not religious. In a broader context, on April 25, 2006,
Iraq’s new Prime Minister Jawad al-Maliki expressed appreciation to Iraq’s
neighbors for sheltering Iraqi dissidents during the former Saddam Hussein regime
but warned them not to interfere in Iraq; he named Iran, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and Turkey.
Iraq Training Support and Troop Support. Jordan has been helpful in its
post-war efforts, specifically in providing training and facilities for selected units and
recruits of the new Iraqi security forces. Since 2003, the Jordan International Police
Training Center (JIPTC), located outside of the capital city of Amman, has prepared
more than 30,000 cadets. Graduating classes number approximately 1,500 cadets who
train for eight weeks. There are 390 instructors in Jordan from approximately 15
countries. The United States provides the funding for the center at approximately
$100 million annually. Jordan also has trained Iraqi special operations forces and air
force personnel. Jordan also has provided training for Iraqi soldiers, including
women, at the Jordanian Military Academy at Zarqa, 17 miles north of Amman.
According to allied coalition officials, Jordan has also donated military  and police
equipment to Iraqi forces, including 250 Ukranian-built BTR-94 armored personnel
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carriers (APCs), 100 British Spartan APCs, and U.S. M113A1 APCs, along with 2
C-130BHercules transport aircraft and 16 UH-1H utility helicopters. 
Relatives of Saddam Hussein and Ba’athists Residing in Jordan.
Frictions between Jordan and Iraq continue over the future status of Saddam
Hussein’s relatives and former Ba’ath Party officials residing in Jordan as guests of
the government. The Iraqi government has demanded that Saddam Hussein’s eldest
daughter, Raghdad, be extradited to Iraq to stand trial. Iraq has placed Raghdad on
a list of its 41 most wanted persons. Iraqi officials have alleged that  members of
Saddam Hussein’s family and inner circle currently in Jordan are providing financial
and media support to the insurgency in Iraq in an effort to revitalize the banned Ba’th
Party in Iraq.13 King Abdullah granted Raghad and her sister, Rana, asylum on
humanitarian grounds after the start of U.S. military operations in 2003. 
Oil for Food Program.  During the decade preceding Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Jordan imported between 70,000 and 95,000 barrels per day of oil and oil
products from Iraq. Jordan bought the oil at discounted prices, and actual payments
were made in commodities rather than cash, through shipments of humanitarian
goods from Jordan to Iraq.  These transactions were outside the U.N.-approved oil-
for-food program; however, the United Nations “took note” of Jordan’s position that
it had no other source of oil, and U.S. administrations waived legislation that would
have penalized Jordan for these transactions on this basis. 
Iran
Jordan has had generally poor relations with Iran since the establishment of the
Islamic Republic in 1979, due in part to Jordanian allegations that Iran was
promoting Islamic opposition in Jordan. There were indications of a warming trend
between the two countries during mid-2004, however, at least on the commercial
level. During a landmark visit by King Abdullah to Iran on September 3, 2004 — the
first by a Jordanian ruler in over 20 years — the two sides discussed bilateral trade
and security. Asked about Iran’s nuclear program during his September 28, 2004
interview, then Foreign Minister Muasher reiterated Jordan’s view that there should
be a nuclear freeze in the Middle East including “Israel, Iran, and the others.” 
U.S. Aid, Trade, and Military Cooperation
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Jordan
The United States has provided economic and military aid, respectively, to
Jordan since 1951 and 1957.  Total U.S. aid to Jordan through 2004 amounted to
approximately $8 billion. Levels of aid have fluctuated, increasing in response to
threats faced by Jordan and decreasing during periods of political differences or
worldwide curbs on aid funding.  The United States has markedly increased its aid
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to Jordan since the mid-1990s to help Jordan strengthen its economy, maintain
domestic stability, and pursue normalization with Israel.  Between FY1998 and
FY2002, annual U.S. economic and military aid levels to Jordan were approximately
$150 million and $75 million, respectively.  However, after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, aid to Jordan increased significantly. In FY2003, aid to Jordan was
almost doubled, amounting to $250 million in economic and $198 million in military
assistance.  In addition, Jordan received $700 million in economic and $406 million
in military assistance in FY2003 supplemental funding, to help offset the effects of
the war with Iraq on Jordan’s economy and bolster its security. Between FY2004-
2006, U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan averaged approximately $556 million. Table
1 shows U.S. levels of U.S. assistance to Jordan since 1990.
FY2006 Supplemental Aid. P.L. 109-234 (H.R. 4939), the FY2006
Emergency Supplemental Act, provides $50 million in economic assistance to
Jordan. The Jordanian government had originally requested $200 million from the
Administration. The Senate version of H.R. 4939 contained $100 million in
economic aid for Jordan to continue and accelerate economic reforms. The House
version contained no funding. 
FY2007 and Other Funds.  For FY2007, the Administration is requesting
$245 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) and $206 million in Foreign Military
Financing Funds (FMF) for Jordan.  U.S. economic aid to Jordan is provided partially
to support USAID projects and partly as a cash transfer to service Jordan’s debt.  In
addition to the preceding funds specifically earmarked for Jordan, the last three
emergency supplemental bills contain funds to reimburse Pakistan, Jordan, and other
key cooperation states for logistical expenses in support of U.S. military operations:
$1.4 billion in FY2003; $1.15 billion in FY2004; and $1.37 billion in FY2005. 
Millennium Challenge Account.  In fiscal year 2006, Jordan has been listed
by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as a threshold country in the lower
middle-income bracket. Although this designation does not qualify Jordan for
immediate assistance, as a threshold country, Jordan could receive small grants to
help it improve underperforming areas so that Jordan would be more competitive for
Millenium Challenge Account (MCA) funding in future years. The MCC is
evaluating the Jordanian government’s reform efforts before deciding whether it
qualifies for MCC threshold assistance. If the MCC concludes that Jordanian
democratic reforms have been sufficient, Jordan could receive threshold assistance
in FY2007. These funds may be used to accelerate domestic reforms to allow Jordan
to qualify for the MCC’s larger Compact funding program. MCC Compact grants
may be as large as several hundred million dollars.
Trade
Jordan ranked 70th among U.S. trading partners in volume of trade with the
United States in 2005, about the same as its ranking of 69th in 2004.  According to
the U.S. Census Bureau, Jordan’s imports from the United States increased from
$317 million to $643 million between 2000 and 2005, and Jordan’s exports to the
United States increased even more notably from $73 million to $1,267 million during
the same period.  Principal U.S. commodities imported by Jordan consisted of
aircraft parts, machinery and appliances, vehicles, and cereals, while Jordan’s main
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exports to the United States included clothing and accessories, precious stones, and
precious metals.  Two recent measures, in particular, have helped expand U.S.-
Jordanian trade ties and could create more opportunities for U.S. investment in
Jordan.
Free Trade Agreement.  On October 24, 2000, then President Clinton and
King Abdullah witnessed the signing of a U.S.-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement,
which eliminated duties and commercial barriers to bilateral trade in goods and
services originating in the two countries.  Earlier, in a report released on September
26, 2000, the U.S. International Trade Commission concluded that a U.S.-Jordan
Free Trade Agreement would have no measurable impact on total U.S. imports or
exports, U.S. production, or U.S. employment.  Under the agreement, the two
countries agreed to enforce existing laws concerning worker rights and environmental
protection.  On January 6, 2001, then-President Clinton transmitted to the 107th
Congress a proposal to implement the Free Trade Agreement.  On July 23, then-U.S.
Trade Representative Zoellick and then-Jordanian Ambassador Marwan Muasher
exchanged letters pledging that the two sides would “make every effort” to resolve
disputes without recourse to sanctions and other formal procedures.  These letters
were designed to allay concerns on the part of some Republican Members over the
possible use of sanctions to enforce labor and environmental provisions of the treaty.
President Bush signed H.R. 2603, which implemented the FTA as P.L. 107-43 on
September 28, 2001, during King Abdullah’s visit to Washington following the
September 11, 2001, attacks.  For additional information, see CRS Report RL30652,
U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, by Mary Jane Bolle.
Qualifying Industrial Zones.  An outgrowth of the Jordanian-Israeli peace
treaty was the establishment of “Qualifying Industrial Zones” (QIZs), under which
goods produced with specified levels of Jordanian and Israeli input can enter the
United States duty free, under the provisions of P.L. 104-234.  This act amended
previous legislation so as to grant the President authority to extend the U.S.-Israel
free trade area to cover products from QIZs between Israel and Jordan or between
Israel and Egypt.  QIZs were designed both to help the Jordanian economy and to
serve as a vehicle for expanding commercial ties between Jordan and Israel.
Although QIZs have succeeded in boosting U.S.-Jordanian trade, there has been only
a modest increase in Jordanian-Israeli trade.
Currently there are 11-13 QIZs in Jordan employing approximately 55,000
people (working 8 hour days/6 days a week), 69% of whom are foreign workers from
South East Asian nations like Pakistan, India, Banghladesh, and Sri Lanka. In
general, foreign laborers are generally viewed as more skilled and productive than
local Jordanians. In addition, it is difficult for employers to recruit local Jordanians
since workers typically live on site, and many are hesitant to separate from their
families, though in some areas local Jordanians are provided with free transportation
to the QIZs. 
On May 3, 2006, the National Labor Committee (NLC), a New York-based
human rights advocacy group, issued a 161-page report alleging sweatshop-like
conditions in 28 out of 100 Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) plants in Jordan. Jordan’s
trade minister Sharif Zu’bi subsequently acknowledged that the government had
failed in some instances to enforce its own labor laws and has taken action since to
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close down factories in violation of the law. The NLC has recognized the
government’s recent actions, though it has suggested that violations of worker rights
may continue in smaller factories. Foreign companies with operations inside QIZs
must provide food and housing for workers. Conditions in worker dormitories are
reportedly inspected by retail garment buyers, and the Jordanian government provides
medical clinics and security for the zones. For additional information, see CRS
Report RS22002, Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan: A Model for Promoting
Peace and Stability in the Middle East?, by Mary Jane Bolle, Alfred Prados, and
Jeremy Sharp. 
Military Cooperation
Military Sales.  The United States is helping Jordan modernize its armed
forces, which have been the traditional mainstay of the regime.  The Jordanian
military forces, though well trained and disciplined, are outnumbered and outgunned
by each of Jordan’s neighboring forces. In recent years, Jordan has used U.S. military
assistance grants to purchase Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles, upgrades
for its fleet of F-16 fighters (approximately 70-80), and BlackHawk helicopters. The
United States also delivered three Patriot anti-missile batteries to Jordan in early
2003 prior to the start of U.S. military operations in Iraq. 
Joint Exercises and Training.  A U.S.-Jordanian Joint Military
Commission has functioned since 1974.  Combined training exercises by U.S. and
Jordanian military units continue to take place in Jordan ( dubbed “Early Victor”),
at least on an annual basis and sometimes more often.  The above-mentioned courses
conducted by Jordan for Iraqi military personnel are reportedly being funded by the
United States under a program called the New Iraqi Army Training Project.14
Although Jordan currently has no equivalent to the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), plans are underway to construct the King Abdullah II Center for
Special Operations Training, which is scheduled to be completed in 2006. The
Center, which has been partially financed by the United States including with $99
million in appropriations from the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Act (P.L. 109-
13), will serve as a regional headquarters for counter-terrorism and homeland security
cooperation. In 2003, Jordan built a Special Operations Command and the Anti-
Terrorism Center in order to boost counter-terrorism capabilities within the military.
Other Activities. Under the provisions of Section 517 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, then President Clinton designated Jordan as a
major non-NATO ally of the United States, effective on November 13, 1996.
According to a State Department spokesman, this status “makes Jordan eligible for
priority consideration for transfer of excess defense articles, the use of already
appropriated military assistance funds for procurement through commercial leases,
the stockpiling of U.S. military material, and the purchase of depleted uranium
munitions.”
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According to U.S. and Jordanian officials, Jordan has deployed two military
hospitals to Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, and has committed almost 600 health
care professionals to the two facilities.  Both facilities provide critical health care to
numerous patients, including civilians.  The hospital in Afghanistan cares for more
than 650 patients a day, having treated more than 500,000 since it was first deployed
in December 2001.  The one in Iraq has treated more than four million people, and
surgeons have performed 1,638 operations.
Section 574(a) of P.L. 108-447, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act,
FY2005, bans ESF funds to governments that are party to the International Criminal
Court (ICC) and have not concluded an agreement with the United States preventing
the ICC from proceeding against U.S. personnel present in the country concerned.
This act contains waiver authority in the case of NATO or major non-NATO allies
of the United States.  A similar provision is contained in Section 574(a) of P.L. 109-
102, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2006.  Jordan signed such an
agreement with the United States on December 16, 2004; however, the Jordanian
lower house of parliament rejected the agreement during a special session of
parliament on July 14, 2005.  Subsequently, on August 29, 2005, President Bush
issued Presidential Determination (PD) 2005-33 waiving the ban with respect to
Jordan for six months.  (The President had issued an earlier six-month waiver on
February 10, 2005, though PD-2005-20.)  On January 8, 2006, however, the lower
house reversed its July 2005 vote and endorsed the measure granting immunity from
ICC prosecution to U.S. personnel and U.S. employees working in Jordan.  The bill
had already been endorsed by the upper house, paving the way for the King’s
signature.
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Economic Assistance Military Assistance
Totals
EconSpt Food Devel PeaceCp FMF* IMET**
1991 35.0a 0 0 0 20.0a 1.3 56.30
1992 30.0b 20.0 0 0 20.0b .6 70.60
1993c 5.0 30.0 0 0 9.0 .5 44.50
1994d 9.0 15.0 4.0 0 9.0 .8 37.80
1995 7.2 15.0 6.7 0 7.3 1.0 37.20
1996 7.2 21.0 7.9 0 200.0e 1.2 237.30
1997f 112.2 2.6 4.5 1.1 30.0 1.7 152.10
1998f 150.0 0 0 1.2 75.0g 1.6 227.80
1999 150.0 0 0 1.4 70.0g 1.6 223.00
1999 (Wye) 50.0 0 0 0 50.0 0 100.00
2000 150.0 0 0 1.7 75.0 1.6 228.30
2000 (Wye) 50.0 0 0 0 150.0 0 200.00h
2001 150.0 0 0 1.7 75.0 1.7 228.40
2002 150.0 0 0 1.6 75.0 2.0 228.60
2002 (Suppl.) 100.0 0 0 0 25.0 0 125.00
2003 250.0 0 0 1.0 198.0 2.4 451.40
2003 (Suppl.) 700.0 0 0 0 406.0 0 1,106.00
2004 250.0 0 0 2.3 206.0 2.9 461.20
2004 (Suppl.) 100.0 0 0 0 0 0 100.00
2005 250.0 0 0 1.6 206.0 3.0 460.60
2005 (Suppl.) 100.0 0 0 0 100.0 0 200.00
2006i 250.0 0 0 1.6 210.0 3.0 464.60
2007j 245.0 0 0 0 206.0 3.1 454.10
Note:  These figures do not include debt relief subsidy appropriations or small amounts for de-mining
assistance.  Nor do they include supplemental funding requested by the Clinton Administration in
FY2001 (never acted upon by Congress).
*Foreign Military Financing
**International Military Education and Training Program
a.  Suspended in April 1991 under P.L. 102-27; released in early 1993.
b.  Released in late July 1993.
c.  Restrictions on FY1993 funds waived by Presidential Determination (PD) 93-39, Sept. 17, 1993.
d.  FY1994 funds released by PD 94-11, Jan. 13, 1994, waiving restrictions under P.L. 103-87.
e.  Three components: $30 million (Administration’s original request); $70 million in additional FMF
under FY1996 appropriation (P.L. 104-134) to cover balance of F-16 aircraft package; and $100
million in special drawdown authority (P.L. 104-107).
f.  These figures include $100 million in economic assistance under the President’s Middle East Peace
and Stability Fund ($100 million in FY1997, $116 million in FY1998).
g.  For each of these two years, FMF figure includes $25 million in drawdown authority.
h.  Some of these funds were obligated in later years (FY2001 or FY2002).
i.   Administration’s request for FY2006, with FMF slightly increased by the conference report on P.L.
109-102.
j.  Administration’s request.
